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Abstract
The article aims at examining, in the light of the practice of the International Court of Justice,
some issues concerning the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures to prevent
the aggravation or extension of a dispute. While the existence of a power to indicate non-
aggravation measures appears to be well established in the Court’s case law, the scope of
this power has proved to be a more controversial issue. This study argues that, by attaching
relevance to the element of aggravation, the Court has been able to indicate measures that are
not strictly needed to prevent a risk of irreparable harm but which at any rate contribute to
a greater protection of the rights of the parties; at the same time, however, the Court has so
far refrained from regarding the risk of aggravation as a circumstance whichmay justify a less
stringent evaluation of the other conditions that normally need to be satisﬁed for the granting
of interim protection under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute.
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1. INTRODUCTION: AGGRAVATION OF A DISPUTE AS A BASIS FOR
GRANTING PROVISIONAL MEASURES
Under Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the Court), the
Court has the power to indicate provisional measures in order ‘to preserve the
respective rights of either party’. The emphasis laid by this provision on the preser-
vation of rights clearly suggests that the primary purpose of the Court’s power to
indicate provisional measures is – to use the words of the Court – ‘to prevent irre-
parable prejudice to the rights that are the subject of the dispute’.1 In fact, however,
the Court has also made use of its power under Article 41 for a different purpose,
considering itself to be entitled to indicate measures aimed at preventing the ag-
gravation or the extension of the dispute.While the existence of a power to indicate
non-aggravationmeasures appears to bewell established in the Court’s case law, the
scope of this power has proved to be a more controversial issue.
∗ Associate Professor of International Law, University of Macerata.
1 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, para.
62 (not yet published).
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Non-aggravation measures were ﬁrst indicated by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in its Order of 5 December 1939 rendered in the Electricity Company
of Soﬁa and Bulgaria case. The Permanent Court included in the operative part of its
Order a measure directing Bulgaria, inter alia, to ‘ensure that no step of any kind is
taken capable . . . of aggravating or extending the dispute submitted to the Court’.2
The Order did not offer a clear explanation as to the reasons which led the Court
to indicate a measure of this kind,3 nor did the Permanent Court clarify whether
it considered the power to indicate non-aggravation measures as merely ancillary
to the power to indicate measures aimed at preventing irreparable prejudice to the
rights of the parties.
In its early case law the present Court had frequently indicated non-aggravation
measures. In many cases the Court had inserted in the operative parts of its orders
granting provisionalmeasures an indication to the effect that the parties should ‘en-
sure that no action of any kind is takenwhichmight aggravate or extend the dispute
submitted to theCourt’.4 Yet indications of this kind appeared to be standard clauses
which merely complemented more speciﬁc measures. Among the circumstances
which came into play in order to justify the decision of granting interim protection,
theCourt’sordersdidnotrefer to the issueof theaggravationof thedispute.Themain
focuswas on the preservation of the rights sub judice.5 Accordingly, the indication of
provisional measures was generally conditional on speciﬁc requirements, namely
urgency and the risk of irreparable damage to the rights at issue in themain case. In
the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case the question was raised whether the Court has
the power to indicate provisional measures for the sole purpose of preventing the
aggravation or extension of a dispute; however, the Court did not ﬁnd it necessary
to examine this issue, since it excluded the possibility that in that case there was an
actual risk of aggravation of the dispute.6
A clear reference to theCourt’s power to indicate provisionalmeasures toprevent
the aggravation of the dispute is contained in theOrder of 10 January 1986, rendered
by the Chamber of the International Court of Justice formed to deal with the case
concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali). In that case, which
related to a dispute over the delimitation of the boundary, both parties requested the
indication of provisionalmeasures because of certain armed actions in the disputed
area. In a much quoted statement, the Chamber held that
2 Electricity Company of Soﬁa and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Request for the Indication of Provisional
Measures, Order of 5 December 1939, PCIJ Rep. (Series A/B) No. 79, at 199.
3 On the possible reasonswhich led the Permanent Court to adopt this solution see J. Sztucki, InterimMeasures
in the Hague Court (1983), 76–7.
4 See, for instance, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Provisional Measures, Order of 5 July
1951, [1951] ICJ Rep. 89, at 93; Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v.
Iceland), Interim Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, [1972] ICJ Rep. 12, at 17; Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, [1973] ICJ Rep. 99, at 106. For a review of the Court’s
practice, see S. Oda, ‘ProvisionalMeasures’, in V. Lowe andM. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International
Court of Justice. Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (1996), 541, at 552–3.
5 See Sztucki, supra note 3, at 74 ff.
6 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, [1976] ICJ Rep.
3, at 13, para. 42.
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independently of the requests submitted by the Parties for the indicationof provisional
measures, the Court or, accordingly, the chamber possesses by virtue of Article 41 of
the Statute the power to indicate provisional measures with a view to preventing the
aggravation or extension of the dispute whenever it considers that circumstances so
require.7
While, as we shall see, different views have been held as to the actual meaning
of this statement, the fact remains that such an explicit recognition of the power of
the Court to take non-aggravation measures was novel.8 The Chamber’s intention
was clearly to stress the importance of the issue of aggravation of a dispute as a
circumstance which might warrant the indication of provisional measures. This
aspect also emerges from other points of the Chamber’s Order. In particular, the
manner in which the operative part of the Order was structured is signiﬁcant in
this respect. The ﬁrst measure indicated was one directing both parties not to take
any action of any kind which might aggravate or extend the dispute. As noted by
one author, ‘this suggests that the containment of the dispute was perhaps seen
as a matter of priority in this case’.9 The Chamber then indicated more speciﬁc
measures concerning the preservation of evidence, the observance of a ceaseﬁre,
the withdrawal of the armed forces of either party, and the administration of the
disputed areas.
The approach followed by theChamberwas subsequently endorsed by theCourt.
In the case concerning Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria,
the Court was confronted with a situation which had many similarities with that
in the Frontier Dispute case. The dispute concerned, inter alia, the delimitation of the
territorialboundarybetweenthe twostates. Followingarmedactions in thedisputed
areas, provisionalmeasures were requested by both parties. In its Order of 15March
1996, the Court recognized that
independently of the requests for the indication of provisional measures submitted
by the Parties to preserve speciﬁc rights, the Court possesses by virtue of Article 41 of
the Statute the power to indicate provisional measures with a view to preventing the
aggravation or extension of the dispute whenever it considers that circumstances so
require.10
The same statementwas repeatedby theCourt in itsOrder of 1 July 2000 rendered
in the case concerningArmed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.11
It might be argued that the point made by the Court (or by the Chamber) in
the above-mentioned statements was mainly directed at emphasizing the fact that
the Court is empowered to indicate, proprio motu, provisional measures which are
7 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January 1986, [1986] ICJ
Rep. 3, at 9, para. 18.
8 In the same vein, J. Sztucki, ‘Case Concerning Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria): Provisional
Measures, Order of 15March 1996’, (1997) 10 LJIL 341, at 351.
9 J.G.Merrils, ‘InterimMeasuresof Protection in theRecent Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCourtof Justice’,
(1995) 44 ICLQ 90, at 123.
10 Land andMaritime Boundary between Cameroon andNigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), ProvisionalMeasures, Order
of 15March 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 13, at 22, para. 41.
11 ArmedActivities on the Territory of the Congo (DRCv.Uganda), ProvisionalMeasures, Order of 1 July 2000, [2000]
ICJ Rep. 111, at 128, para. 44.
626 PAOLO PALCHETTI
different from those requested by the parties.12 However, these statements also lend
themselves to a different interpretation. It may be said that the intention of the
Court was to convey the idea that, under Article 41 of the Statute, it possesses a
power to indicate non-aggravationmeasures which is ‘independent’ of the power to
indicatemeasures preserving the rights of either party against irreparable prejudice.
‘Independence’ in this regard would have a double meaning. This power would be
‘independent’ in the sense that the indication of non-aggravation measures would
not be subject to the same conditions which are normally required when interim
protection is sought in order to preserve the rights at issue in a dispute. But it would
also mean that the Court would be entitled to indicate non-aggravation measures
for the sole purpose of preventing the aggravation of a dispute, even if nomeasures
preserving the rights of the parties are indicated.
The latter interpretation of the Court’s (and Chamber’s) case law has found some
supportbothwithin theCourtand in the legal literature.Thus, for instance, referring
to the above-mentioned statement in the Frontier Dispute case, Judge Bedjaoui, who –
it is interesting to note – was the president of the chamber dealing with that case,13
observedthat theChamber’sOrder inaugurated ‘acase lawwhich, insteadof focusing
onareviewofeachprerequisite to the indicationofprovisionalmeasures, givespride
of place to a comprehensive analysis of the “circumstances” of the case’;14 he also
infers from the Chamber’s dictum that the indication of provisional measures ‘in
the general terms of an exhortation to all the parties not to aggravate or extend the
dispute . . . does not in any way depend upon the indication of other, more speciﬁc
provisional measures’.15 In the same vein, Thirlway, commenting on the statement
of the Court in the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case,
observed that ‘what is clearly meant is that the power to indicate non-aggravation
measures exists whether or not preservative measures are indicated’.16
However, a recent decision of the Court seems, at least in part, to contradict this
reading of the Court’s prior case law. In its Order of 23 January 2007, rendered in
the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay,17 the Court retained a narrow
view as to the scope of its power to indicate provisional measures to prevent the
aggravation of a dispute. Aswe shall see later, the Court refused to indicate a general
12 See K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 41’, in A. Zimmermann, C. Tomuschat, and K. Oellers-Frahm (eds.), The Statute
of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2006), 923, at 932.
13 The Chamber was composed of Judges Bedjaoui (president), Lachs, and Ruda, and of Judges ad hoc Luchaire
andAbi-Saab. Judge Lachs had also advocated amore active role for the Court in contributing to the peaceful
settlement of disputes. In his Separate Opinion attached to theOrder of 11 September 1976 in theAegean Sea
Continental Shelf case, he criticized the Court, arguing that it should have put greater stress on ‘the need for
restraint on the part of both States and the possible consequences of any deterioration or extension of the
conﬂict’. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 6, at 20. However, Judge Lachs was not suggesting that the
Court should indicate provisional measures; he was arguing that the Court shouldmake recommendations
to the parties. On the distinction between provisional measures and recommendation, see infra, section 5.
14 Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of
14 April 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 143, at 158, para. 32 (Judge Bedjaoui, Dissenting Opinion).
15 Ibid.
16 H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989. Part Twelve’, (2001) 72
British Year Book of International Law 37, at 103. Contra Sztucki, supra note 8, at 351.
17 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2007 (not
yet published), paras. 49–50. The author of this article wishes to acknowledge that he acted as advisor for
Uruguay in the proceedings.
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measure directing the parties not to aggravate or to extend the dispute, arguing that
in its previous case law it had only indicated a measure of this kind when more
speciﬁc measures had also been indicated.
Thepurpose of thepresent study is to examine, in the light of theCourt’s practice,
some issues concerning the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures to
prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute. No doubt, by placing emphasis
on the issue of aggravation the Court has taken a broad view as to the scope of its
power under Article 41. However, it remains to be seen towhat extent the Court has
actually reliedon the riskof aggravationasabasis forgrantingprovisionalmeasures.
This study argues that, by attaching relevance to the element of aggravation, the
Court has been able to indicate measures that are not strictly needed to prevent a
risk of irreparable harm but which at any rate contribute to a greater protection of
the rights of the parties; at the same time, however, the Court has refrained so far
from regarding the risk of aggravation as a circumstance which may justify a less
stringent evaluation of the other conditions that normally need to be satisﬁed for
thegrantingof interimprotectionunderArticle 41. In the light of this consideration,
it is not believed that the recent decision in the Pulp Mills case is inconsistent with
the position taken by the Court in its previous case law. This does not mean that
the explicit recognition by the Court of the limits of its power to indicate non-
aggravation measures does not constitute a signiﬁcant novelty, whose reasons and
implications deserve to be further explored.
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 will attempt to deﬁne the notion
of aggravation of the dispute with a view both to clarifying better the distinction
between non-aggravation measures and measures preserving speciﬁc rights, and to
assessing whether, in the Court’s view, a risk of aggravation of the dispute presup-
poses a situation of threats or actual use of force in the relations between the parties.
Section 3 deals with the conditions for the indication of non-aggravationmeasures;
itsmainpurpose is toanalyse theviewsexpressedby someauthors andby individual
judges according to which, when the Court seeks to prevent the aggravation of a
dispute, certain conditions which are normally required for the indication of provi-
sionalmeasures do not apply. Section 4 addresses the question ofwhether the Court
is empowered to indicate non-aggravation measures in a case in which measures
preserving rights are not indicated; it is in this context that the recent decision in the
Pulp Mills case will be examined. Section 5 is dedicated to the question concerning
the content and legal effects of themeasures that the Courtmay indicate to prevent
the aggravation of a dispute. In the ﬁnal paragraphs the main conclusions of the
study will be recapitulated.
2. WHAT ARE THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MAY JUSTIFY THE
INDICATION OF NON-AGGRAVATION MEASURES?
Article41of theStatuteprovides that theCourthas thepower to indicateprovisional
measures if ‘circumstances so require’. The urgency and the risk of irreparable
prejudice totherights thatare thesubjectof thedisputehavegenerallybeenregarded
by the Court as the main circumstances that may justify the grant of provisional
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measures.However,whenreferenceismadetothepowertoindicatenon-aggravation
measures, relevance is given to a different circumstance, namely the risk of an
aggravation of the dispute. The notion of aggravation seems to include a broader
category of conduct than that covered by the notion of irreparable harm. While
conduct giving rise to irreparable harm also results in an aggravation of the dispute,
the opposite does not necessarily hold true.18 Thus the main difference between
non-aggravation measures and other preventive measures seems to lie in the fact
that only the latter type of measure presupposes the existence of an urgent need to
prevent irreparable harm to the rights in dispute, while non-aggravation measures
are related to actionswhich, by aggravating the dispute, create a riskmore generally
of prejudice to the rights of the parties.19
TheCourt has not given explicit indications as to the test to be applied in order to
determine whether the risk of aggravation is such as to require the grant of interim
protection. It must be appreciated in the light of the particular circumstances of
each case whether there is a risk of an aggravation. At ﬁrst glance, a restrictive view
of the notion of aggravation appears to have been adopted by the Chamber dealing
with the FrontierDispute case. In the above-mentionedOrder of 1986, the recognition
of the power to indicate non-aggravation measures was immediately followed by
the consideration that, in situations which
comprise a resort to force which is irreconcilable with the principle of the peaceful
settlement of international disputes, there can be no doubt of the Chamber’s power
and duty to indicate, if need be, such provisional measures as may conduce to the due
administration of justice.20
The link thus established between theCourt’s power to indicate non-aggravation
measures and situationswhich ‘comprise a resort to force’may be taken as implying
that, in the Chamber’s view, the use of such power must be limited to situations
involving a threat of force or even an actual use of force.
To be sure, the indication of non-aggravationmeasures is particularly warranted
in situations involving the risk of a military escalation. However, this does not
seem to be the only circumstance in which these measures may be ordered. There
is little support for such a restrictive view in the Court’s case law prior to the
Chamber’s Order, as the Court had indicated non-aggravation measures even in
cases where there was no question of the use of force.21 Nor does it seem that the
Court has endorsed the Chamber’s view in its subsequent case law. It is true that
the other two cases inwhich the Court expressly referred to its ‘independent’ power
to indicate non-aggravation measures – the Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria case and the case concerningArmed Activities on the Territory of
18 Sztucki, supra note 3, at 74.
19 Referring to the above-mentioned measure indicated by the Permanent Court in the Electricity Company of
Soﬁa and Bulgaria case, Hersch Lauterpacht signiﬁcantly observed that, following that decision, ‘the possible
irreparability of the damage ceased to be the decisive criterion applied by the Court’. H. Lauterpacht, The
Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (1958), 253.
20 Frontier Dispute case, supra note 7, at 9, para. 19.
21 Perhaps the clearest example in this respect is the Court’s Order of 22 June 1973 rendered in the case
concerning theNuclear Tests, supra note 4.
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the Congo – both related to situations involving the use ofmilitary force.22 However,
in these cases the Court refrained from expressly linking the power to indicate
non-aggravationmeasures to situations involving the use of force. In particular, the
statement contained in paragraph 19 of the Chamber’s Order was not repeated in
the Court’s two subsequent Orders. Moreover, it is signiﬁcant that the Court has
sometimes taken into consideration the possibility of indicating non-aggravation
measures in situations where it was clear from the outset that there was no risk
of a military escalation. In Criminal Proceedings in France, for instance, the Court
contemplated the possibility of using this power in relation to a situation where
there was no question of the use of force. Its refusal to grant such measures was
not grounded on the fact that there was no risk of a military escalation. The Court
simply found that, under the circumstances of the case, there did not appear to be
‘any need for measures of this kind to be indicated’.23
It serves little purpose to link the power to indicate non-aggravation measures
to the risk of a military conﬂict. First, as we shall see, the establishment of such a
link could not guarantee that the Court would grant interim protection in every
such situation, given that its power is, in any event, dependent on the existence of a
prima faciebasisof jurisdiction.24 Furthermore, therearenoevident reasonswhythe
Court should limit the use of its ‘independent’ power to indicate non-aggravation
measures to cases where there is a risk of military confrontation. An aggravation
or extension of the dispute may be caused by actions that, without involving the
threat or use of force,may have similar negative effects on the relations between the
parties.
It is interesting to note that, in the ﬁrst case in which the risk of an aggravation
of the dispute was taken into account in the context of a request for provisional
measures, a broad meaning was given to the notion of aggravation. In its Order of
5 December 1939, rendered in the Electricity Company of Soﬁa and Bulgaria case, the
Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that states that were parties to
a dispute before it had a duty not to aggravate this dispute. It spoke of a principle
universally accepted to the effect that the parties to a case must ‘not allow any step
of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute’.25 This wide
reference to ‘steps of any kindwhichmight aggravate or extend the dispute’ seemed
to imply that, in the Court’s view, the notion of aggravation was not restricted to
22 This circumstance is reﬂected in the formula employed by the Court in the operative part of its orders.
The ﬁrst measure indicated in the Order rendered in the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria reads as follows: ‘Both parties should ensure that no action of any kind, and particularly no action by
their armed forces, is taken . . . which might aggravate or extend the dispute before it’. Supra note 10, at 24.
In the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, the Court indicated a measure directing the parties
to ‘prevent and refrain from any action, and in particular any armed action, . . . which might aggravate or
extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difﬁcult to resolve’. Supra note 11, at 129. It may be
observed that the formula employed by the Court in both cases, referring to action of any kind, ‘particularly’
armed action, seems to imply a recognition that actions other than armed actionmight also risk aggravating
the dispute.
23 Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Provisional Measures, Order of 17 June 2003,
[2003] ICJ Rep. 102, at 116, para. 39.
24 On this point, see Thirlway, supra note 16, at 102.
25 Electricity Company of Soﬁa and Bulgaria, supra note 2, at 199.
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acts of amilitary nature.Whatever opinion onemayhave about the precise relation
between the infringement by the parties of their duties as litigants before the Court
and the indication of provisional measures,26 it seems reasonable to argue that the
view expressed by the Permanent Court suggests that the range of acts whichmight
aggravate a dispute is not limited to those involving the use of force.
3. CONDITIONS FOR THE INDICATION OF NON-AGGRAVATION
MEASURES: THE COURT’S JURISDICTION TO DEAL WITH THE
DISPUTE AND THE LINK BETWEEN THE MEASURES REQUESTED
AND THE MAIN DISPUTE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES
When a request for provisional measures is ﬁled with a view to preserving speciﬁc
rights, the Court has to be satisﬁed, inter alia, that it has prima facie jurisdiction
with regard to the merits of the case and that the rights sought to be preserved
by the requested provisional measures are the same rights which constitute the
subject matter of the main dispute.27 One may ask whether the same conditions
apply in relation to the Court’s power to indicate provisional measures with a view
to preventing the aggravation or extension of a dispute. It may be maintained that
these conditionsare strictly related to the idea thatprovisionalmeasures are ameans
directedprimarily towardspreservingtherightsat issue inacaseandthat theydonot
necessarily apply when the Court seeks to prevent the aggravation of a dispute.
A radical view has sometimes been expressed by individual judges to the effect
that, when confronted with situations involving the use of force, the Court has
the power to indicate provisional measures directed at preventing the aggravation
of a dispute regardless of whether the Court has prima facie jurisdiction to deal
with that dispute. This view is mainly premised on the idea that the Court, as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has an important role to play in the
maintenance of international peace. This role of the Court would justify, inter alia,
a less stringent application of the conditions that generally apply for the indication
of provisional measures in cases involving the threat or the actual use of force.28
The view described above was apparently advocated by some judges in their
dissenting opinions attached to the Court’s Orders of 2 June 1999 in the Legality of
26 On this point, see Sztucki, supra note 3, at 79 ff. The existence of a connection between the Court’s power
to indicate non-aggravation measures and the parties’ duty not to interfere with or obstruct proceedings
pending before the Court by coercive extrajudicial means was recently advocated by Judge Buergenthal in
his declaration annexed to the Court’s Order of 23 January 2007 in the case concerning PulpMills on the River
Uruguay.
27 For an examination of the Court’s practice in this respect see S. Rosenne, ‘Provisional Measures and Prima
Facie Jurisdiction Revisited’, in N. Ando, E. McWhinney, and R. Wolfrum, Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda
(2002), I, 514;C.Dominice´, ‘Lacompe´tenceprima faciede laCour internationalede Justiceauxﬁnsd’indication
de mesures conservatoires’, ibid., 383; Oellers-Frahm, supra note 12, at 934.
28 Referring to the views sometimes held by individual members of the Court, one author has raised the
question whether a special regime for provisional measures in cases involving the use of force is emerging.
See C. Gray, ‘TheUse andAbuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases Concerning theUse of Force after
Nicaragua’, (2003) 14 EJIL 867, at 888 ff. On the Court’s power to indicate provisional measures in situations
involving theuseof force, see alsoR.Ranjeva, ‘Laprescriptionpar laCour internationalede Justicedemesures
conservatoire a` porte´e militaire’, in E. Yapko and T. Boumedra (eds.), Liber Amicorum – Mohammed Bedjaoui
(1999), 449.
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the Use of Force cases. In these cases, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had requested
the Court to indicate provisional measures directing the respondent states to cease
their armedaction inKosovo.TheCourt refused togrant interimprotection, arguing
that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction to do so; in its Orders, however, it inserted a
statement calling on the parties to respect their obligations under international law
and not to aggravate or extend their dispute.29 Some judges criticized this decision,
contending that, despite the lack of prima facie jurisdiction, the Court would have
been entitled to indicate provisionalmeasures. Thiswas the position taken by Judge
Weeramantry, who clearly stated, ‘I feel the Court should have gone further than it
has done and issued provisional measures on the lines indicated’.30 In his view, the
Courthad jurisdiction, inter alia, ‘to direct bothparties to take allmeasuresnecessary
to prevent an aggravation of the situation and for the restoration and maintenance
of international peace and security in the region’.31 Judges Shi and Vereshchetin
took amore nuanced position. Judge Vereshchetin stated that
even if ultimately the Court may come to the conclusion that, due to constraints in
its Statute, it cannot indicate fully-ﬂedged provisional measures in accordance with
Article 41of theStatute in relation tooneor another of the respondent States, theCourt
is inherently empowered, at the very least, immediately to call upon the Parties neither
to aggravate nor to extend the conﬂict and to act in accordance with their obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations.32
Similarly, Judge Shi said that
theCourtwouldhavebeen fully justiﬁed inpointof law if, immediatelyuponreceiptof
the request by the Applicant for the indication of provisionalmeasures, and regardless
ofwhatmight be its conclusion onprima facie jurisdictionpending its ﬁnal decision, it
had issued a general statement appealing to the Parties to act in compliance with their
obligations under theCharter of theUnitedNations and all other rules of international
law relevant to the situation, including international humanitarian law, and at least
not to aggravate or extend their dispute.33
It isnotclearwhatkindofmeasures, intheviewofJudgesShiandVereshchetin, the
Court should have taken – whether it should have been a simple recommendation
to the parties or a provisional measure under Article 41. Since the Court’s Orders
did in fact contain in its reasons a general statement recommending that the parties
avoid aggravating the dispute, it seems reasonable to hold that what they had in
mind was the indication of a provisional measure.34
Whatever the views expressed by these judges, the fact remains that the Court
has never taken into consideration the possibility of indicating non-aggravation
measures in the absence of a basis for prima facie jurisdiction.While this point has
not been explicitly dealt with by the Court, it has to be noted that in all the cases
29 Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep.
124, at 140, para. 49.
30 Ibid., at 203.
31 Ibid., at 202.
32 Ibid., at 209.
33 Ibid., at 207.
34 In the same vein see Gray, supra note 28, at 889.
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in which the Court indicated non-aggravation measures, a ﬁnding of prima facie
jurisdictionwas invariably regardedasanecessaryprecondition forgranting interim
protection. When it found that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction, it refrained from
indicating any provisional measures, without inquiring whether such measures
werewarranted in the light of the risk of an aggravation of the dispute. In such cases
the only ‘relief’ that the Court was disposed to grant was to insert in its reasoning
a statement recommending to the parties that they respect their obligations under
international law and refrain from aggravating or extending the dispute.35 Since
statements of this kind are not included in the operative part of the Court’s orders,
they cannot be regarded as equivalent to provisional measures. I will revert to this
question later.36
While the position of the Court on the issue of jurisdiction is hardly surprising
and does not seem to deserve comment, a more complex problem concerns the
requirement that provisional measures relate to the main claims which constitute
thesubjectmatterofthedispute. It isnotself-evidentwhynon-aggravationmeasures,
basedastheyareontheneedtoensurethecontainmentofadispute, shouldbestrictly
limited to protecting the rights of the parties at issue in the case. Thus the view has
been expressed that non-aggravationmeasures,with their emphasis on the restraint
of escalation,
are by deﬁnition unrelated to the nature of the rights claimed, except by the tenuous
link that the actions that are to be enjoined must presumably be actions that might
aggravate the dispute over those rights, not actions that might generally impair good
relations between the parties.37
An even stronger view has been advanced by one author, who argued that, when
the Court seeks to prevent the aggravation of a dispute, it is empowered to pro-
tect rights other than those already at issue in the case, provided that there is an
instrument which confers on the Court prima facie jurisdiction to deal with those
rights.38
It seems doubtful that the Court is entitled to grant interim protection to rights
which are not at issue in themain case. In that regard, it is not enough for the Court
to be able, in principle, to rely on an instrument granting jurisdiction over those
rights. It is for the parties to delimit the object of the dispute over which the Court
is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court does not have the power to
protect proprio motu rights of the parties that are not in dispute in the case before it;
35 Apart from theOrders of 2 June 1999 in the Legality ofUse of Force cases, see alsoArmedActivities on the Territory
of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Provisional Measures, Order
of 10 July 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep. 219, at 249–50, para. 93.
36 Infra section 4.
37 Thirlway, supra note 16, at 106. According to this author, since non-aggravation measures do not strictly
relate to the rights in dispute in a case, it would be difﬁcult to see how the jurisdiction to indicate measures
of this kind ‘can be an element of the jurisdiction to entertain the merits’. Ibid., at 85.
38 In this sense see D. W. Greig, ‘The Balancing of Interests and the Granting of Interim Protection by the
International Court’, (1991) 11Australian Year Book of International Law 108, at 127. According to Greig, ‘there
would seem to be no logical reason against the granting of interimmeasures to prevent an extension of the
dispute to encompass other rights appertaining to the litigants’; to this end, ‘an appropriate test might be to
limit the Court’s competence under Article 41 by reference to the question of whether the rights sought to
be protected also fell, prima facie at least, within its jurisdiction on themerits’.
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this would constitute an ultra petita. Moreover, as interim protection is granted by
virtue of an incidental jurisdiction, it does not seem that a party could be allowed to
extend the subject of the dispute through a request for provisional measures aimed
at protecting rightswhich, until thatmoment,were not at issue in the case. If a party
wishes to obtain interim protection of a right which is not at issue in the dispute
pending before the Court but which may be infringed by the conduct of the other
party, and if that party may rely on a valid jurisdictional basis, it may always decide
to submit a new application and request the Court to indicate provisionalmeasures
relating to those rights.
Even in those cases where great signiﬁcance was accorded to the need to prevent
the aggravation of a dispute, the Court was careful to stress that the measures
requested were strictly linked to the main dispute submitted by the parties. Thus,
for instance, in the Frontier Dispute case, the Chamber referred to the fact that ‘the
armedactionsthatgaverise totherequests for the indicationofprovisionalmeasures
submitted to the Chamber took place within or near the disputed area as deﬁned
by the Special Agreement’.39 Similarly, in its Order of 15 March 1996 in the case
concerning Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, the Court
remarked that ‘armed actions regrettably occurred on territory which is the subject
of proceedings before the Court’.40 Both statements were clearly directed at linking
the need to prevent the military escalation in the disputed area with the subject
of the main dispute, thereby suggesting that, by preventing the aggravation of the
dispute, theCourtwas alsohelping topreserve the rights at issue in themain case. In
theOrder of 8April 1993 rendered in theApplication of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)), the link between the non-aggravation measure indicated to the
parties and the subject of the main dispute was clearly reﬂected in the formula
employed in the operative part of that Order, which runs as follows:
The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and
theGovernment of the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina should not take any action
and should ensure that no action is taken whichmay aggravate or extend the existing
dispute over the prevention or punishment of the crime of genocide, or render it more
difﬁcult of solution.41
The Court’s adherence to the principle that interim protectionmust relate to the
rights at issue in the case is also shown by the fact that, in all cases in which it
had indicated non-aggravation measures, the Court did not take into account only
the element of aggravation. Even in those cases where it placed particular emphasis
on that element, the Court maintained that the facts giving rise to the aggravation
also created a risk of irreparable damage to the rights of the parties at issue in
the case. Thus, in its Order in the Land and Maritime Boundary case, the Court ﬁrst
39 Frontier Dispute case, supra note 7, at 9, para. 16.
40 Land andMaritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, supra note 10, at 22, para. 39.
41 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] ICJ Rep. 3, at 24,
para. 52.
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considered that ‘the rights at issue in these proceedings are sovereign rights which
the Parties claim over territory’, adding that ‘these rights also concern persons’;42 it
thenobserved that ‘theevents thathavegivenrise to the request, andmoreespecially
the killing of persons, have caused irreparable damage to the rights that the Parties
may have over the Peninsula’.43 Quite apart from the question of whether it is right
to assume that the killing of persons falls within the subject matter of a dispute
concerning a question of sovereignty over a territory – a point which prompted
some reactions even within the Court itself44 – it should be noted that, by referring
to the risk of irreparable damage to the rights at issue, the Court showed that the
focus of its intervention was mainly related to the protection of the rights at issue
in the case, and not the protection of rights falling outside the subject matter of the
dispute.
Thus theCourt’s practice reveals that the elementof aggravationmust in any case
be linkedwith the protection of the rights of the parties which are at issue in a case.
This conclusion, which conforms to the idea underlying Article 41 of the Statute
that the function of interimmeasures is to protect the rights of the parties at issue in
a case, should not be taken as implying that no differences exist between measures
preserving the rights of the parties from irreparable damage and non-aggravation
measures. As we have seen in section 2, the notion of aggravation of the dispute
covers awider category of actions than thenotionof irreparable prejudice.However,
the fact that non-aggravation measures are not strictly needed to prevent a risk
of irreparable prejudice does not mean that they are not related to the protection of
the rights at issue in the case. As noted by one author, ‘the possible aggravation or
extension of the dispute is a circumstance inwhichmeasures could be given but the
measures must, in all cases, be aimed at preserving the rights of the parties’.45
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NON-AGGRAVATION MEASURES
AND MEASURES AIMED AT PRESERVING SPECIFIC RIGHTS
Since the notion of aggravation of the dispute is broader than the notion of irrepar-
ableharm, thesituationmayarisewhereaparty takesactionwhichrisksaggravating
thedisputebutwhich isnot suchas to cause an imminent riskof irreparableharmto
the rights of the other party. Onemaywonderwhether, in such situations, the Court
would be prepared to exercise its power under Article 41 solely for the purpose of
preventing the aggravation of a dispute.
42 Land andMaritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, supra note 10, at 22, para. 39.
43 Ibid., at 23, para. 42. See also the Court’s Order of 1 July 2000 in the case concerning Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo, supra note 11, at 125, para. 43.
44 In his declaration annexed to the Court’s Order, Judge Oda remarked that ‘loss of life in the disputed area,
distressing as it undoubtedly is, does not constitute the real subjectmatter of the dispute’. Land andMaritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, supra note 10, at 26–7, para. 2. On this point see also Thirlway, supra
note 16, at 98; Y. Iwamoto, ‘The Protection of Human Life through Provisional Measures Indicated by the
International Court of Justice’, (2002) 15 LJIL 345.
45 J. B. Elkind, Interim Protection: A Functional Approach (1981), at 228. For a similar view see also Merrils, supra
note 9, at 123; L. Daniele, Le misure cautelari nel processo dinanzi alla Corte internazionale di giustizia (1993),
at 91.
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As has already been observed, the Court’s case law prior to the recent decision in
the Pulp Mills case did not provide a clear answer to this question. By admitting, as
it did in its Order in the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
case, that, under Article 41, it possesses the power to indicate non-aggravation
measures ‘independently of the requests for the indication of provisional measures
submitted by the Parties to preserve speciﬁc rights’, the Court had given credence
to the view that the indication of provisional measures in order only to prevent
the aggravation of the dispute was to be regarded as admissible. As a matter of
fact, however, the Court had never based the indication of provisional measures
solely on the need to prevent the aggravation of the dispute. Admittedly, in some
cases, the main focus was on the issue of aggravation. Yet, as we have seen, in
conjunction with that issue the Court always referred also to the existence of a
risk of irreparable harm to rights which constituted the subject of the dispute.
Thus without excluding the possibility of indicating non-aggravation measures in
cases inwhichnomeasures preserving rights are indicated, theCourt refrained from
availing itself of this possibility, preferring instead to rely also on theneed toprevent
irreparable harm to the rights of the parties.
TheCourt’s approachcouldbeexplainedby the fact that,when thecircumstances
of a case might involve an imminent risk of irreparable harm, the Court would also
ﬁnd it appropriate to refer to that element, as this would provide a more reassuring
basis for granting provisional measures. Indeed, as noted by Judge Buergenthal in
his declaration appended to the Order of 23 January 2007 in the Pulp Mills case, the
fact that the Court had not had occasion to indicate non-aggravation measures in
a case in which measures preserving rights had not also been indicated ‘does not
necessarily prove that it lacks the power to do so’.46 In the sameOrder, however, the
Court took a different position. Uruguay had requested the Court to indicate three
differentprovisionalmeasures, theﬁrstbeinga speciﬁcmeasuredirectingArgentina
to take all steps at its disposal to prevent or end the interruption of transit between
Uruguay and Argentina, the other two being general measures directing Argentina
to abstain fromanymeasureswhichmight aggravate the dispute and to refrain from
any other measure that might prejudice the rights of Uruguay at issue in the case.
The Court refused to grant the ﬁrst measure because it found that there was no risk
of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Uruguay at issue in the case.47 With regard
to the second measure requested by Uruguay, the Court noted that, in all cases in
which it issued provisional measures directing the parties not to take any conduct
which would aggravate or extend the dispute, other measures were also indicated;
thus it found that since it had not upheld the ﬁrst provisionalmeasure requested by
Uruguay it could not indicate the othermeasure requested by that state to the effect
that Argentina should abstain fromanymeasure thatmight aggravate or extend the
46 PulpMills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), supra note 17, para. 8 (Judge Buergenthal, Declaration).
47 Ibid., para. 41.
636 PAOLO PALCHETTI
dispute.48 For the same reasons theCourt decided that it could not indicate the third
measure requested by Uruguay.49
As the Court dealt with this point very concisely, different interpretations can be
advancedas to the exactmeaningof theCourt’s reasoning concerning the indication
of non-aggravation measures. It may be argued that the Court intended simply to
say that it cannot indicate a general measure directing the parties to refrain from
conduct aggravating the dispute when the circumstances of a case do not warrant
the indication of more speciﬁc measures. This interpretation would allow for the
possibility that, under certain circumstances, theCourt could indicate speciﬁcmeas-
ures aimed at preventing the aggravation of the dispute even when no provisional
measures are held to be needed in order to preserve the rights of the parties from an
imminent risk of irreparable harm. Yet if one interprets the Court’s dictum in the
light of the speciﬁc context of that case – taking into account, in particular, the fact
that the other measure requested was aimed at preserving Uruguay’s rights at issue
in the case and that the Court had refused to grant such a measure because of the
lack of an imminent risk of irreparable harm to Uruguay’s rights – amore plausible
readingof theCourt’sOrderwould suggest that, in theCourt’s view,non-aggravation
measures can be granted only if the circumstances of a case are such as to require
the indication of measures aimed at preventing irreparable harm to the rights of
the parties. Thus non-aggravationmeasures wouldmerely be ancillary tomeasures
directed at preserving speciﬁc rights.
This reading of the Order is supported also by the views held in this respect by
Judge Buergenthal, who found that the Court’s ﬁndings
are based on the conclusion that the Court lacks the power under Article 41 to indicate
anyprovisionalmeasures in a case inwhich therehas beenno showingof an imminent
risk of irreparable prejudice to the subject matter in dispute between the parties.50
In his declaration Judge Buergenthal criticized the Court’s ‘restrictive interpreta-
tion’ of Article 41, arguing that, by taking this position, the Court did not adequately
address the problem of how to deal with
situations in which one party to the case resorts to extrajudicial coercive measures,
unrelated to the subject matter in dispute, that aggravate a dispute by seeking to
undermine or interfere with the rights of the other party in defending its case before
the Court.51
While, for the above-mentioned reasons, it cannot be argued that the conclusion
reached by the Court in this Order contradicts its previous case law, as Judge Buer-
genthal seems to suggest,52 it is difﬁcultnot toagreewithhimonthe fact thatneither
48 Ibid., paras. 49–50.
49 Ibid., para. 51.
50 Buergenthal, supra note 46, para. 10.
51 Ibid., para. 11.
52 Ibid. Judge Buergenthal noted that the language employed in Art. 41 permits a less restrictive interpretation
than that adopted by the Court, specifying that such an interpretation ‘ﬁnds expression in the Court’s
repeated assertions that it “possesses by virtue of Article 41 of the Statute the power to indicate provisional
measures with a view to preventing the aggravation or extension of the dispute whenever it considers that
circumstances so require”’.
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the language of Article 41 nor the previous case law warranted such a conclusion.
Indeed, this decision appears to be based on a restrictive interpretation of Article 41.
The cautious approach followed by the Court in this case is the more remarkable
because, as pointed out by several commentators,53 since the Chamber’s statement
in the Frontier Dispute case the Court’s case law appeared to be characterized by a
tendency towards attaching ever more relevance to the issue of aggravation. Since
the Order of 23 January 2007 does not provide elements which may help to clarify
the reasons for the Court’s restrictive view, one may only attempt to identify some
possible reasons as amatter of conjecture. I shall come back to this point in the next
section.
5. THE CONTENT AND LEGAL EFFECTS OF NON-AGGRAVATION
MEASURES
The fact that it is now clear that non-aggravation measures cannot be indicated
in the absence of a risk of irreparable damage to the rights of the parties should
not lead one to underestimate the possible relevance of the issue of aggravation
within the context of the Court’s power under Article 41. Even if the existence of a
risk of an aggravation of the dispute does not per se justify the granting of interim
protection, such a risk remains one of the circumstances which has to be taken into
account when considering what measures are to be indicated in order to protect
the rights of the parties. In other words, while attaching decisive importance to the
possible risk of irreparable prejudice, the Court is not bound to focus exclusively
on this element, but can also consider the broader implications that the actions
of one of the parties may have on the dispute before it. This, in turn, reﬂects on
the content of the measures that the Court would be entitled to indicate. In this
respect, the element of aggravation plays a signiﬁcant role in that it seems to widen
the margin of appreciation of the Court in determining what measures should be
ordered. In particular, the existence of a risk of aggravation of a dispute may justify
the indication by the Court of measures that are not strictly needed to prevent the
rights of the parties from being irreparably prejudiced.54
The point now made is well illustrated by certain cases in which the Court
did not merely call on the parties to refrain from aggravating the dispute but also
speciﬁed the steps that the parties had to take to that end. Thus, as we have seen,
in the Order rendered in the Frontier Dispute case the Chamber, in addition to a
provisional measure directing the parties to ensure that no action be taken which
might aggravate the dispute or prejudice the right of the other party, indicated
53 See Sztucki, supra note 8, at 357 (‘It appears that in the recent decades in general, and in the present case
in particular, the Court, using Article 41, is embarking on exercising just these powers – powers of general
prevention’); Oda, supra note 4, at 552–3 (‘It seems, however, that the Court has become inclined to interpret
article 41 of the Statutemuchmore widely so as to cover cases in which the prevention of an aggravation or
extension of the dispute is required or evenwhere the status quo needs to bemaintained, although it has not
indicated provisional measures solely to that end’); Thirlway, supra note 16, at 99 (‘Recent developments in
the practice of indication of provisional measures suggest that there has been some shift of thinking within
the Court away from the intentions of the Statute in this respect’).
54 On this point see Sztucki, supra note 3, at 77.
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more speciﬁc measures concerning, inter alia, the respect of a ceaseﬁre agreement
and the withdrawal of armed forces from a certain area.55 Similar measures were
indicated by the Court in the Land and Maritime Boundary case. Since in these two
cases the existence of a risk of irreparable prejudice was also recognized, it cannot
be said that these measures were exclusively aimed at preventing an aggravation
of the dispute.56 However, it seems that, in shaping the content of some of them,
the need to prevent the aggravation of the dispute had a major role. This point was
acknowledged explicitly by the Chamber, at least as far as themeasure directing the
parties to withdraw their troops from the disputed area was concerned:
The measures which the Chamber contemplates indicating, for the purposes of elim-
inating the risk of any future action likely to aggravate or extend the dispute, must
necessarily include the withdrawal of the troops of both Parties to such positions as to
avoid the recrudescence of regrettable incidents.57
In the great majority of cases, non-aggravation measures have taken the form
of a general request that the parties refrain from any action which may aggravate
or extend the dispute. Indeed, general measures of this kind have been regarded
as standard clauses, as the Court usually included such measures in the operative
part of its orders.58 Recently, however, general statements recommending that the
parties refrain from aggravating the dispute have sometimes been included in the
reasons of the orders. This has happened, in particular, in cases in which the Court
had found that the conditions for granting provisional measures were not satisﬁed.
In addition to the above-mentioned Orders in the Legality of the Use of Force cases,
one may also refer, for instance, to the Orders of 13 July 2006 and 23 January 2007
in the PulpMills case.59 With regard to this practice, it can askedwhat the difference
is, if any, between a statement of this kind included in the operative part of an order
indicating provisional measures and a similar statement included in the reasons of
such order. Are these latter statements also to be considered as an expression of the
Court’s power, under Article 41, to indicate non-aggravationmeasures?
The question now raised is strictly related to a different one, which concerns
the legal effects of provisional measures aimed at preventing the aggravation of
the dispute. The problem is whether the recognition of the Court in the LaGrand
case that provisionalmeasures have binding effects also applies to non-aggravation
measures.60 If one considers that general statements of this kinddonothavebinding
effect evenwhen they are included in the operative part of aCourt’s order indicating
provisional measures, it would make little difference whether these statements are
55 Supra section 1.
56 For a different view see Thirlway, supra note 16, at 107, who argues that only the measure directing the
parties to preserve the status quo as regards the administration of the disputed areas ‘could be regarded as a
true preservative provisional measure’.
57 Frontier Dispute case, supra note 7, at 10–11, para. 27.
58 See Sztucki, supra note 3, at 77, who observed that the function of these general clauses appeared to be that
of reinforcing other measures that the Court could decide to indicate.
59 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), respectively supra note 1, para. 82, and supra note 17,
para. 53.
60 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 2001, [2001] ICJ Rep. 466, at 506,
para. 109.
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included in the operative part or in the reasons of an order: in each case they would
be no more than recommendations made by the Court with no binding effects on
the parties.
However, there seems to be little doubt that, when included in the operative
part of an order, non-aggravation measures have binding effect on the parties.61 In
its judgment rendered in the LaGrand case, the Court referred explicitly to non-
aggravation measures. When indicating the reasons which pointed to the binding
character of provisionalmeasures, it noted that ‘measures designed to avoid aggrav-
atingorextendingdisputeshave frequentlybeen indicatedby theCourt’, adding that
these measures ‘were indicated for the purpose of being implemented’.62 Further-
more, in all cases subsequent to the LaGrand judgment, inwhich the question of the
compliance with orders indicating provisional measures was raised, the Court has
never distinguished between non-aggravation measures and measures preserving
rights, considering both kinds ofmeasures as having binding effect.63 Most recently,
in its judgment of 26 February 2007 in the Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro) case, theCourt noted that ‘theCourt’s order of 8April and 13 September
1993 indicating provisional measures created legal obligations which both Parties
were required to satisfy’;64 among the measures having binding effect referred to
by the Court, the above-mentioned measure indicating that the parties were not to
aggravate the dispute was also explicitly included.
The difference between statements calling on the parties not to aggravate the
disputewhich are contained in the operative part of an order and similar statements
included in the reasons is therefore clear: only the former statements may be con-
sidered to beprovisionalmeasures and, as such, tohave binding effect on theparties.
Statements included in the reasons are to be considered simply as recommenda-
tions addressed to the parties.65 Obviously, the latter type of statement is not subject
to the same conditions as provisional measures. In fact, the Court often resorts to
such recommendationswhen the conditions for granting interimprotection are not
satisﬁed.
Although the difference between non-aggravation measures and statements in-
cluded in the reasons is easy to detect, it is more problematic to establish whether
there is a connection between the recognition of the binding effect of provisional
measures and theCourt’s recent practice onmatters concerning the aggravation of a
dispute. As regards the tendency to include in the reasons a statement calling on the
parties not to aggravate the dispute, it has been suggested that a connection could
indeed exist: since it is now clear that only statements included in the operative part
61 Similarly, see Thirlway, supra note 16, at 107.
62 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), supra note 60, at 503, para. 103.
63 See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea inter-
vening), Merits, Judgment of 10 October 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep. 303, at 453, para. 321; Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), Merits, Judgment of 18 December 2005, para. 262 (not yet published).
64 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia andMontenegro), Merits, Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 452 (not yet published).
65 In the same sense, J. D’Aspremont, ‘TheRecommendationsMade by the InternationalCourt of Justice’, (2007)
56 ICLQ 185, at 187–8.
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can be considered as provisional measures having binding effect, it would be easier
for the Court to include such general statements in its reasons.66 For the purposes
of the present study, however, far more relevant is the question of whether there is
a link between the position recently taken by the Court in its Order of 23 January
2007 and the novelty introduced with the LaGrand judgment. It is here submitted
that also in this respect a connection could be found to exist. Two different, albeit
related, arguments can be advanced in this regard.
First, it may be argued that the recognition of the binding effects of provisional
measures has led the Court to take a more cautious approach in administering its
powerunderArticle 41. Since, aswehave seen, thenotionof aggravationof a dispute
coversawidercategoryofactionsthanthatof irreparableprejudice,arequest fornon-
aggravationmeasuresmay be designed to obtain from the Court interim protection
in cases in which there is only a tenuous link between the rights at issue in the case
and the actions to be enjoined. By specifying that non-aggravationmeasures cannot
be rendered in a case in which there is no risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights
of the parties at issue in a case, the Court might have wanted to stress the fact that
its intervention under Article 41 aims primarily at the preservation of such rights,
thus dispelling any doubts as to the possibility that, by taking into account the need
to prevent the aggravation of the dispute, the Court would be entitled to extend its
binding power to indicate provisional measures on matters which are unrelated or
only tenuously related to that over which it has jurisdiction.
The second argument moves from the consideration of the content of the non-
aggravationmeasure that the Court was requested to indicate in the PulpMills case.
In its Order of 23 January 2007 the Court said that it could not grant provisional
measures consisting solely of an injunction directing the parties not to take any
actionswhich could aggravate or extend the dispute. It is submitted that the Court’s
refusal to indicate a measure having the form of a general request to the parties not
to aggravate the dispute could be a consequence of the new context created after the
Court’s judgment in the LaGrand case.
When the Court does not specify what actions one or both parties should take
in order to prevent the aggravation of the dispute, the question may arise as to the
possible implications ﬂowing from this general measure. In the absence of speciﬁc
indications, partiesmayhavedifferentviewsas towhat conductwouldconstitute an
infringement of such a measure. Prior to the Court’s judgment in the LaGrand case,
this problem did not attract much attention in the Court’s practice. In the Hostages
case, the Court mentioned the fact that the incursion into the territory of Iran by
the United States was contrary to a previous Court Order indicating that no action
was to be taken by either party whichmight aggravate the tension between the two
countries. Yet in that case the Court made only a cursory reference to this issue.67
66 For this observation see T. Treves, ‘The Political Use of Unilateral Applications and Provisional Measures
Proceedings’, in J. A. Frowein, K. Scharioth, I. Winkelmann, and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Verhandeln f u¨r den
Frieden – Negotiating for Peace. Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel (2003), 463, at 479.
67 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Merits, Judgment of
24 May 1980, [1980] ICJ Rep. 3, at 43, para. 93. For an examination of the Court’s position in this case, see S.
Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920–1996 (1997), III, at 1149–50.
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The scant attention given at that time to the question concerning the parties’
compliancewithprovisionalmeasures isnotsurprisingifoneconsiders that,until its
judgment in the LaGrand case, the Court had not taken a position onwhether or not
provisional measures are binding on the parties.68 Now that the Court has clariﬁed
thatprovisionalmeasuresarebinding, the issueofcompliancewithsuchmeasures is
going toarisemore frequently in theCourt’spractice. Parties arenowfullyentitled to
request theCourt to rule that theotherpartyhasviolated its internationalobligation
to comply with a provisional measure and can even submit a claim for reparation.
In fact, recent practice shows that, when the relevant conditions arise, parties have
included in their ﬁnal submissions a request concerning the issue of compliance
with provisional measures.69
Thus, in the new context created after the Court’s judgment in the LaGrand case,
the question of whether conduct gives rise to an aggravation of the dispute is likely
to become a more important issue for litigant states. When formulated in general
terms, non-aggravationmeasures could be used by a party as a ground for advancing
far-reaching claims as to the steps that the other party has to take in order to comply
with such measures. While it will be for the Court to decide whether such claims
are justiﬁed in the light of themeasures previously indicated, andwhile, in any case,
a party can decide to submit a new request for provisional measures, it seems that,
under certain circumstances, non-aggravation measures framed in general terms
may generate a state of uncertainty in the relations between the parties and may
therefore give rise to a further dispute.70 This may help to explain why the Court
has refused to grant provisional measures consisting solely of a general statement
relating to the need to prevent the aggravation of the dispute. While the Order of
23 January 2007 does not exclude the possibility that theCourtmay indicate general
measures of this kindwhen other, more speciﬁc, measures are also indicated, it may
be thought, for the reasons explained above, that, even in such a case, the Courtmay
tend to avoid including non-aggravation measures formulated in general terms in
the operative part of its orders.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Since the explicit recognition in the 1986 Frontier Dispute Order that under Article
41 theCourt has an ‘independent’ power to indicatemeasures to prevent the aggrav-
ation or extension of the dispute, different views have been taken as to the scope of
thisCourt’s power. It has been argued, not least by individual judges, that theneed to
prevent the escalation of a dispute, particularly in cases involving a threat or actual
68 For an analysis of the Court’s practice prior to the judgment in the LaGrand case, see Oellers-Frahm, supra
note 12, at 954–5; P. Gaeta, La giustizia cautelare nel diritto internazionale (2000), at 147.
69 See the Judgments referred to supra notes 63 and 64.
70 In this respect see the remarks made by Judge Eiriksson in his dissenting opinion annexed to the Order of
27 August 1999 rendered by the International Tribunal of the Law for the Sea in the Southern Blueﬁn Tuna
case. He contested the decision of the Tribunal to indicate a measure – which was binding on the parties –
‘of so general a nature that a party cannot be entirely clear when contemplating any given action whether
or not it falls within its scope’. The text of Judge Eiriksson’s opinion is available at the Tribunal’s website
(http//www.itlos.org).
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use of force, could justify a less stringent application of the conditions generally
applied for the indication of provisionalmeasures; the view has also been advanced
by some that the Court is entitled to indicate non-aggravation measures in cases in
whichmeasures preserving the rights of the parties are not indicated.
These views, which are based on an extensive interpretation of Article 41, do
not ﬁnd support in the Court’s practice. Admittedly, in some cases the indication of
provisionalmeasuresappearedtohavebeenmotivatedmainlybytheneedtoprevent
an aggravation of the dispute. It is true, moreover, that by relying on the element of
aggravation, the Court considered itself to be entitled to indicate measures which
appeared to go beyond what was strictly needed in order to prevent irreparable
prejudice to the rights at issue in the case. Nevertheless, non-aggravation measures
have been indicated only when the Court has found that all the conditions which
normallymust be satisﬁed for the indication of provisionalmeasures, including the
existence of a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of the parties, were satisﬁed.
While in its previous case law the Court had never indicated non-aggravation
measures in cases where measures preserving rights were not also indicated, it is
only in its recent Order in the Pulp Mills case that the Court has explicitly ruled out
the possibility that it had the power to do so. The clear limitation imposed by the
Court on its power to indicate non-aggravation measures is a signiﬁcant novelty. It
has been argued that there could be a link between this new development and the
recent recognition, made in the LaGrand judgment, that provisional measures are
binding.
